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Circuit Breakers With Uncertainty About the Presence of  
Informed Agents: I Know What You Know … I Think 
   
This study examines the effect of circuit breakers on market behavior when agents are 
uncertain about the presence of private information.  In our experimental asset markets traders 
know the probability that there is private information in the market.  We investigate whether 
market-wide trading halts play a useful role in moderating unwarranted price movements in 
periods without private information.  These periods are particularly interesting because all trade 
is uninformative but some traders may erroneously infer otherwise.  If some agents mistakenly 
believe that there is private information in the market, they may mimic others’ trading behavior, 
drawing still others in and causing asset prices to spiral away from fundamental value.  Camerer 
and Weigelt (1991) provide some evidence of such information mirages (see also Anderson and 
Holt (1997)).  We investigate whether circuit breakers dampen or prevent price movements 
away from fundamental value, particularly in periods in which private information is absent.
1   
Limited empirical research examines the role of circuit breakers in markets (Lauterbach 
and Ben-Zion (1993), Santoni and Liu (1993), and Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000)) because 
such studies are replete with challenges.
2  It is nearly impossible to isolate the effect of 
impediments to trade on market behavior using archival methods.  Stock prices and associated 
volatility change for a variety of reasons that may or may not be related to shifts in underlying 
fundamentals.  Archival methods also are unable to ascertain what would have happened in the 
absence of circuit breakers.  Further, the NYSE circuit breaker rule has been activated only  
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once since being instituted.  However, recent research suggests that the probability of an 
extreme market movement is non-negligible (Booth and Broussard (1998), Bakshi and Madan 
(1999)).
3  Thus, significant issues remain unresolved. 
With an experimental method we can control the distribution of information across 
traders and time and conduct an investigation that cannot be completed using data from naturally 
occurring markets.  We are able to compare market outcomes under three circuit breaker 
regimes: market closure, temporary halt, and no interruption.  Ackert, Church, and Jayaraman 
(2001) provide some recent experimental evidence on the effect of a circuit breaker rule.  In 
their experiment, a subset of agents always receives private information about asset value.  By 
design, asset prices should move away from an uninformed expectation toward an informed one 
as information is disseminated.  Ackert, Church, and Jayaraman conclude that a circuit breaker 
rule does not inhibit price movement toward the informed price, though agents advance trade in 
anticipation of a breaker being triggered. 
In the current study, circuit breakers may have the beneficial effect of mitigating 
unwarranted price movements.  In periods without a subset of informed agents, asset prices 
should not deviate from the uninformed expectation.  But uninformed agents do not know 
whether others’ actions reflect informed or uninformed trade, and they may incorrectly infer that 
price signals are informative.  If agents mistakenly believe that others’ actions reflect private 
information, circuit breakers may temper deviations from fundamental value.  In this case, circuit 
breakers may protect against large, non-information-based price movements. 
The results of this study indicate unequivocally that circuit breakers fail to temper 
unwarranted price movements.  In fact, breakers that trigger a temporary halt appear to have a  
 
3
detrimental effect.  Our data suggest that with a temporary halt, price moves away from 
fundamental value in periods without private information.  This result may occur because a 
temporary halt provides traders time for introspection, allowing them to dwell on irrelevant or 
unimportant information (e.g., Tordesillas and Chaiken (1999)).  In turn, agents may be more 
likely to mistakenly infer that others possess private information.  We do not, however, find any 
evidence that circuit breakers affect trading volume in the absence of private information.  
Allocative efficiencies in our markets are high across all market regimes with or without a circuit 
breaker rule.  We conclude that circuit breakers play no useful role in our experimental asset 
markets. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 provides a framework.  
Section 2 describes our experimental design and procedures and provides price and allocation 
predictions.  Section 3 presents empirical tests and evidence on market dynamics with and 
without circuit breakers.  Section 4 provides discussion of the results and concludes the paper. 
 
1. Framework 
A large literature examines whether asset prices efficiently disseminate and aggregate 
diverse information.  Grossman and Stiglitz (1976 and 1980) provide a theoretical basis that 
suggests that equilibrium asset prices aggregate and reveal private information.  Experimental 
research shows that when a subset of agents is known to be informed, asset prices reflect 
private information about asset value (Plott and Sunder (1982), Banks (1985), Sunder (1992), 
and Ackert, Church, and Shehata (1997)).  But little research has examined market behavior 
when the presence of private information is uncertain.  As an exception, Camerer and Weigelt  
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(1991) conduct experimental asset markets in which some periods include private information 
and all traders know the probability that a subset of agents is informed in a particular period.  
They provide some evidence to support the occurrence of information mirages.  Over 47 
experimental periods in which private information is absent, 13 mirages are identified (or 27.7 
percent of the time).
4  Hence, experimental data suggest that in some instances agents overreact 
to uninformative trades.  In addition to the price-path dependence reported by Camerer and 
Weigelt (1991), Anderson and Holt (1997) conduct experiments in which subjects make 
sequential, public predictions and find evidence of cascades. 
In some theoretical models of behavior with asymmetric information, agents infer 
information from previous behavior when decisions are made sequentially.  Importantly, agents 
may rationally follow the decisions of others, even though previous decisions are not necessarily 
based on superior private information.  For example, in an information cascade it is optimal for 
an agent to ignore private information and follow the behavior of others (Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)).
5  Although ignoring private information can be rational, 
inefficient outcomes may result (Banerjee (1992), Avery and Zemsky (1998)).  Most notably, if 
earlier decisions are based on incorrect private information, subsequent decisions may be sub-
optimal. 
In our experimental markets, agents do not know whether others possess private 
information, and they must appraise whether others’ actions reflect informed or uninformed 
trade.  Decisions are not strictly sequential as traders interact when buying and selling in a 
double auction asset market.  We investigate the effect of circuit breakers on the resulting price 
behavior.  In equilibrium, price fully reveals private information and is equal to its fundamental  
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value.  If a circuit breaker is triggered in our markets, agents must assess whether asset prices 
are deviating away from or moving toward fundamental value.  The markets are designed such 
that, in the absence of private information, circuit breakers are triggered when prices are 
deviating away from fundamental value.  Thus, triggering the circuit breaker stops, at least 
temporarily, unwarranted price movements. 
The unwarranted price movements we examine are disequilibrium phenomena.  In the 
sequential decision-making models of Banerjee and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, it is 
not irrational for an agent to follow the decisions of others, disregarding private information.  In 
our experiment price mirages appear because of agent error.  In a period in which no agent has 
private information, traders do not know that prices are uninformative.  As in Camerer and 
Weigelt, a mirage results when agents mistakenly infer information from prices when prices do 
not convey information. 
We include two circuit breaker rules in our experimental design: market closure and 
temporary halt.  With closure, the market is shut down once a breaker is triggered, which 
prevents any further departure from fundamental value.  With temporary halt, the market is 
interrupted and then restarted.  The temporary halt may provide for a cooling-off period or, 
alternatively, it may exacerbate price deviations (i.e., introspection may reinforce beliefs that 
others possess private information).  We compare asset prices in markets with circuit breakers 
to prices in markets that do not include any trading restrictions.  The design allows us to 
determine whether circuit breakers (1) temper unwarranted price movements in the absence of 
private information and (2) affect the occurrence of information mirages.  
 
6
We also investigate the effect of circuit breakers on trading volume.  Ackert, Church, 
and Jayaraman (2001) report that agents advance trade in markets with circuit breakers.  We 
examine whether this result obtains in periods without private information.  For such a result, 
agents likely believe that asset value differs from the uninformed expectation (i.e., agents 
mistakenly believe that others possess private information).   
In addition, we examine whether asset holdings are consistent with theory.  Importantly, 
Camerer and Weigelt (1991), Bossaerts and Plott (2000), and Bossaerts, Plott, and Zame 
(2000) report that while pricing is consistent with theory, certificate holdings are not.  Camerer 
and Weigelt report that prices are consistent with full revelation of information whereas trading 
patterns are consistent with partial revelation.  However, allocative efficiencies are quite high 
even in the absence of private information and improve as traders gain experience.  We report 
the allocative efficiency of the markets providing a measure of the extent to which certificates 
are held by the traders with the highest valuation.  Because circuit breaker rules, when triggered, 
reduce trading time, allocative efficiencies may suffer.  
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2. Experimental Method and Predictions 
2.1. Design and Overview 
We conduct nine experimental asset markets, each consisting of 15 periods.  All 
markets have eight traders who are inexperienced in that none participated in an earlier session.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the experimental parameters.  In markets 1-3 trading is shut 
down on a permanent basis if a circuit breaker is triggered (market closure).  In markets 4-6 
trading is halted on a temporary basis if an extreme price movement activates a circuit breaker 
(temporary halt).  Finally, in markets 7-9 participants are free to transact without any threat of a 
trading interruption (no interruption). 
In each period, market participants trade certificates with one-period lives and receive a 
common dividend for each certificate held at period-end.  At the beginning of each period, 
participants receive an index card that indicates the dividend for the period or “000” (when 
uniformed).  The instructions indicate that, in each period, there is a 50 percent chance that two 
of eight traders will be privately informed of the dividend for the period.  The fraction informed 
each period is reported in Panel B of Table 1.  The presence or absence of informed agents is 
not disclosed at period end. 
 
2.2. Procedures 
At the beginning of each market session participants receive a set of instructions, which 
an experimenter reads aloud.
6  Substantially all participants are master’s students at Georgia 
Tech who have successfully completed a required finance course or are currently enrolled in the 
course.  The average compensation across the 72 traders in our markets is $31.82, which  
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includes trading earnings, a $3.00 bonus if on time for the session, and $2.00 for completing a 
post-experiment questionnaire.  The markets take approximately two hours to complete. 
At the beginning of each period, agents are endowed with two certificates and $200 
cash.  In addition, they receive an index card, which indicates whether they are informed.  
Further, agents are told whether they have to pay a personal tax on dividend earnings.  The tax 
varies across agents and periods.  Agents are instructed that, in each period, one-half of them 
(four out of eight) have a zero tax rate and the remainder have a 30 percent tax rate.  Whether a 
particular agent pays a zero or 30 percent tax on dividend earnings in a particular period is 
determined randomly prior to the market by the experimenters, with the constraint that informed 
traders always have a tax rate of zero.  We vary tax rates across agents to provide an incentive 
to trade.   
Agents receive a dividend for each certificate held at period end.  The dividend is 
determined by drawing from a distribution of five dividends: $3.50, $4.25, $5.00, $5.75, and 
$6.50.  Each dividend is equally likely, so the mean payout is $5.00.  The dividend per period is 
randomly determined by the experimenters prior to the experiment and the same sequence is 
used across all markets.
7  This sequence is reported in Panel B of Table 1.  The dividend is 
publicly announced at period end. 
The experimental markets are organized as double oral auctions.  Traders are free to 
make verbal offers to buy or sell one certificate at a designated price at any time, and all offers 
are publicly announced and recorded.  Outstanding offers stand until accepted or replaced by a 
better bid or ask price.  Short sales are not permitted.  If a circuit breaker is not triggered, all  
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market periods last four minutes.  Participants are not informed of the number of periods to be 
conducted.   
In the markets without trading restrictions, agents are free to trade certificates without 
interruption.  In the markets with circuit breakers, trading may be stopped or temporarily halted 
when there are large upward or downward price movements in the market for all certificates.
8  
Participants are told that market movements are positively, but not perfectly, correlated with the 
prices of the certificates they trade.  Our circuit breaker rules are designed to reflect the fact that 
actual rules tie interruptions in trading to movements in the overall market, as measured by the 
DJIA.  
After each completed transaction, the circuit breaker rule is evaluated.  The probability 
of a trading halt increases as the price moves away from $5.00, the uninformed expected value 
of a certificate.  The probability of a halt is 50 percent if the price moves at least 10 percent but 
less than 20 percent from $5.00.  The probability of a halt increases to 90 percent if the price 
moves 20 percent or more from $5.00.  An experimenter determines whether trading is stopped 
or temporarily halted by drawing a card from one of two decks.  The first set has 5 (5) cards 
labeled “stop” (“go”) and the second has 9 (1) labeled “stop” (“go”). 
In the market closure condition, the market does not reopen until the following period if 
a breaker is triggered.  In the temporary halt condition, trading is suspended for 30 seconds.  
After a suspension, trading resumes as before with the circuit breaker rule for transaction price 
ranges centered on the last transaction price prior to the trading interruption.  A temporary 
trading halt, however, is never triggered in the last 60 seconds of a period.  
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  After the experimenter announces the period’s dividend, traders calculate their cash 
balance by multiplying the number of certificates held by their after-tax dividend and adding their 
earnings from certificate holdings to their cash on hand.  Certificates and cash are not carried 
forward across periods.  Each trader’s endowment is reinitialized at the start of the following 
period.  
At the end of the experiment participants are paid in cash.  Trading profit is converted 
to take-home earnings by multiplying profit by 20 percent.  While the experimenters finish the 
paperwork, participants complete a post-experiment questionnaire.  The questionnaire allows us 
to gather general information about the traders and how they viewed the experiment.
9 
 
2.3. Price and Allocation Predictions 
Theoretical price and allocation predictions are easily derived assuming risk neutrality.  
As noted by Bossaerts and Plott (2000), price behavior in an experiment can be directly 
assessed using the distance between theoretical predictions and actual observed prices.  In the 
absence of private information, the predicted price is simply the uninformed expectation ($5.00) 
and certificates are expected to be held by traders with a zero personal tax rate.  With private 
information, the dividend paid is fully revealed in prices if prices are rationally determined 
because private information is perfect.  In this case, uninformed traders learn from price signals 
and the predicted price is the period’s dividend ($3.50, $4.25, $5.00, $5.75, or $6.50).  
Excess demand exists at any lower price.  Certificates will be held by informed and uninformed 




As noted previously, in the absence of private information, circuit breakers are centered 
around the uninformed expectation so that a breaker should never be triggered if prices are 
rationally determined.  Under rational expectations, deviations from price predictions and 
allocative efficiencies should not differ across the market closure, temporary halt, and no 
interruption conditions.  Even with private information, price should equal the informed price 
predictions if information dissemination is instantaneous.  However, allocation predictions may 
not hold if trading is interrupted by the trigger of a circuit breaker rule because traders simply 
would not have the time to complete all advantageous trades. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Asset Prices 
  Figures 1–9 plot the time series of transaction prices for the nine experimental asset 
markets.  The figures also include the risk neutral, expected price per period, conditioned on the 
presence of private information (informed price).  The horizontal axis denotes the period with a 
“u” when private information is absent (uninformed period) and an “i” when it is present 
(informed period).  The uninformed expectation is $5.00, which is the mean of the dividend 
distribution.  As in Table 2, the informed expectation is the period’s dividend, which is known 
by a subset of agents.  For the markets with circuit breakers, the figures show the breaker 
boundaries, denoted by dashed lines, and an indication of whether the breaker is triggered, 
denoted by a vertical, bold-type line.   
A casual inspection of the figures suggests that, in periods without private information, 
asset prices sometimes wander away from the uninformed expectation.  For example, refer to  
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periods 11 and 12 in the three temporary halt markets (figures 4-6).  By comparison, in periods 
with private information, asset prices generally move toward the uninformed expectation, though 
in many instances prices do not adjust enough (i.e., prices fall short of the predicted price).  We 
also note that circuit breakers are triggered frequently and the breakers appear to be activated 
in both informed and uninformed periods.  Next we turn to formal tests of asset prices.  First we 
examine periods without private information, which are our primary focus, and then turn to 
periods with private information. 
3.1.1. Periods Without Private Information. We compute the average, absolute 
deviation in the closing price per period from the uninformed price, normalized by the 
uninformed price (NAPD).  The means and standard deviations by market condition are shown 
in Panel A of Table 3.  To provide insight into how market behavior evolves over time, the data 
are reported separately for early (periods 1-7) and late (periods 8-15) trading periods.  In the 
early trading periods, no significant differences are observed.  For the late trading periods, the 
NAPD in the temporary halt condition is large in comparison to the other two conditions.  
Tukey pairwise tests indicate that the NAPD for the temporary halt group in the late trading 
periods is significantly different from the NAPDs for the other two groups at p < 0.01.  Over 
late trading periods, price deviations from the uninformed expectation are greater in the 
temporary halt condition, which suggests that temporary breakers do not serve a beneficial role 
in preventing unwarranted price movements.  The deviations becoming larger over time suggests 
that behavior does not converge to rational expectations predictions even with experience. 
  Next, we performed a repeated measures analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) to 
parsimoniously examine the data from all periods without private information.  The analysis  
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includes three independent variables: market condition, period, and an interaction term.  The 
dependent variable is the NAPD per period for each session.   We are primarily interested in 
the effects of market condition on the NAPD per period.  The resulting F-statistic for market 
condition tests whether the average NAPD per session (averaged across all periods without 
private information) differs across the three groups.  We find that market condition is significant 
at p = 0.064 (F = 4.48).  Pairwise tests indicate that the mean of the temporary halt group is 
greater than that of the no interruption group at p = 0.056. 
  The price data suggest that circuit breakers that temporarily halt trading do not prevent 
price from wandering away from the uninformed price.  To gain insight into the data, we 
investigate the frequency with which transaction prices and closing prices deviate from the 
uninformed price by at least 10 percent.  We chose 10 percent because such a deviation is 
necessary to trigger a circuit breaker.  As reported in Panel B of Table 3, transaction prices 
deviate from the uninformed price by at least 10 percent over the later periods much more 
frequently in the temporary halt condition (52.3 percent) than in the market closure (10.7 
percent) and no interruption (4.9 percent) conditions.  The c
2-statistic of 69.84 indicates that 
deviations in transaction prices, relative to 10 percent, are not independent of market condition 
(p < 0.001).  Inferences are similar looking at the closing prices (refer to Panel C of Table 3).   
  To gain additional insight into price behavior in the temporary halt condition, we 
examine price movement subsequent to a temporary halt.  We observe that a temporary halt 
occurs in nine of 24 periods.  In seven of nine periods, price moves farther away from the 
uninformed price once trading resumes or remains very near the price that triggered the breaker.  
In one period, price moves back toward the uninformed price; however, closing price still  
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deviates from the uninformed price by at least 10 percent.
10  Hence, temporary halts do not 
appear to curb large deviations in price from the uninformed price.   
Next we examine the price data to ascertain whether agents overreact to uninformed 
trade.  Agents are presumed to incorrectly infer that private information is present in the market 
if the price consistently deviates from the uninformed price.  Operationally, we classify a period 
as one in which traders overreact to uninformed trade if the following rule is satisfied: three or 
more consecutive trades occur at prices that produce absolute deviations from the uninformed 
price of at least 10 percent and the closing price per period produces an absolute deviation of 
at least 15 percent.  In the 24 periods without private information, the rule is satisfied once in the 
market closure condition, seven times in the temporary halt condition, and never in the no 
interruption condition.
11  The c
2-statistic of 12.09 is significant at p = 0.002.  Temporary trading 
halts appear to have a detrimental effect on market behavior.  In these markets, agents appear 
to be more likely to mistakenly infer that others possess private information.  Time for 
introspection arising from a temporary halt may reinforce beliefs that others have access to 
superior information.  Prior findings suggest that introspection inhibits individuals’ abilities to 
distinguish between important and unimportant information and diminishes the quality of 
decisions (Wilson and Schooler (1991) and Tordesillas and Chaiken (1999)).  Our data are 
consistent with these findings. 
3.1.2. Periods With Private Information.  Next we examine the role of a circuit 
breaker rule in periods with a subset of informed agents.  We compute the average absolute 
deviation in the closing price per period from the informed price, normalized by the informed 
price.  The means and standard deviations by market condition are reported in Panel A of Table  
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4 for early and late trading periods.  Tukey pairwise tests indicate that none of the means are 
significantly different from one another at conventional levels (in all cases p > 0.10).
12   
  Again, we perform a repeated measures ANOVA to parsimoniously examine the data 
from all periods with private information.  The independent variables include market condition, 
period, and an interaction term.  The dependent variable is the NAPD per period for each 
session.   We find that market condition is not significant at conventional levels (F = 2.88, p = 
0.133).  The findings suggest that circuit breakers do not inhibit price from moving toward the 
informed expectation, which is consistent with the results of Ackert, Church, and Jayarman 
(2001). 
Next we determine the frequency with which transaction prices deviate from the 
informed expectation by at least 10 percent.  The data, reported in Panel B of Table 4, indicate 
that, over all transactions, deviations of at least 10 percent occur frequently in each market 
condition.  The c
2-statistics of 3.94 for early periods and 3.83 for late periods indicate that 
price deviations, relative to 10 percent, are independent of market condition (p = 0.140 and p = 
0.148, respectively).  In general, price appears to adjust slowly away from the uninformed 
expectation.  But price typically approaches the informed expectation.  The closing price per 
period is within 10 percent of the informed price the majority of the time in each market 
condition, particularly in the late trading periods (refer to Panel C of Table 4).  Further, 
deviations in the closing price per period, relative to 10 percent, are independent of market 
condition for early and late periods (p = 0.858 and p = 0.492, respectively).   
If asset prices adjust to reflect private information, circuit breakers are likely to be 
triggered.  In the market closure condition, circuit breakers are triggered in ten of 21 periods,  
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with draws also occurring in ten periods.  We find that when the market is shut down, price 
stops short of the informed price six times and overshoots the informed price four times.  In the 
temporary halt condition, circuit breakers are activated in six of 21 periods, with draws 
occurring in nine periods.
13  When the market is halted temporarily, price stops short of the 
informed price four times and overshoots the informed price twice.  When the market is 
reopened, price either moves toward the informed price or remains at its current level.  
 
3.2 Trading Volume 
Table 5 reports the average number of transactions per period by market condition.  
Fewer transactions occur in the market closure condition than in the other two conditions.  The 
average number of transactions per period is 6.34, 8.00, and 8.80 for the market closure, 
temporary halt, and no interruption conditions, respectively.  This finding is not surprising 
because trading occurs over a shorter period of time when the market shuts down.  As shown in 
Table 5, trading periods are open on average less time in the market closure condition (180 
seconds) than in the temporary halt (229 seconds) or no interruption (240 seconds) conditions.  
Tukey pairwise tests indicate that the differences between the market closure condition and the 
other two conditions are significant at p < 0.01. 
In the following analyses, we normalize the number of transactions per period by the 
number of seconds that the trading period is open.  As before, we first examine behavior in 
periods without private information and then periods with private information and present the 
analysis for early and late trading periods.  
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3.2.1. Periods Without Private Information. We compute the average trading volume 
per second in periods without private information.  The means and standard deviations by 
market condition are shown in Panel A of Table 6.  None of the pairwise comparisons are 
statistically significant at conventional levels.
14  We also investigate normalized trading volume 
before and after a temporary halt.  The difference is not statistically significant.  Our findings 
suggest that, in the absence of private information, circuit breakers do not affect trading volume.  
This result contrasts with Subrahmanyam’s (1994) conjecture that circuit breakers compel 
agents to advance their trades.  Likewise, the result is contrary to the experimental findings of 
Ackert, Church, and Jayaraman (2001).  But a fundamental difference is that our result applies 
to periods in which private information is absent.  Subrahmanyam’s (1994) theoretical model 
includes information asymmetries.  In addition, in Ackert, Church, and Jayaraman (2001) a 
subset of agents is informed every period and all agents know of the information asymmetry. 
3.2.2. Periods With Private Information. The means and standards deviations of 
normalized trading volume in periods with private information are shown in Panel B of Table 6.  
The mean of the market closure group is greater than that of the other two groups.  Further 
inspection of the data suggests that, for the market closure group, volume per second is larger in 
periods with halts than in periods without halts.  However, Tukey pairwise tests indicate that the 
differences are not significant at the ten percent level.
15  Next we investigate normalized trading 
volume before and after a temporary halt.  We find that the mean volume before the halt (0.078) 
is greater than the mean volume after the halt (0.029), though the difference is not statistically 
significant with p = 0.117. Subrahmanyam (1994) and Ackert, Church, and Jayaraman (2001) 
conjecture that circuit breakers lead agents to advance their trades in periods with private  
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information.  Though we find no statistically significant effect of a circuit breaker rule on trading 
volume, our results are not inconsistent with this notion.  Importantly, in our markets there is 
greater uncertainty because agents do not know whether there is private information in the 
market. 
Next we test for differences in the trading behavior of uninformed and informed agents.  
For each market condition, we compute the number of transactions per period involving each 
type of agent, normalized by the number of seconds that the trading period is open.  We 
conduct paired t-tests and find that informed agents are involved in significantly more 
transactions than uninformed agents in the market closure and temporary halt conditions.
16  By 
comparison, the difference is not significant at conventional levels in the no interruption 
condition.  Our results suggest that, in markets with a circuit breaker rule, fewer transactions 
involve only uninformed agents.  Yet trades between uninformed agents with tax rates of zero 





3.3 Allocative Efficiency 
  Allocative efficiency is measured by the proportion of certificates held by traders with a 
zero tax rate.  Our data indicate that, consistent with the rational expectations prediction, traders 
who pay no taxes on dividend earnings hold more certificates. 
3.3.1. Periods Without Private Information. Panel A of Table 7 reports the mean 
allocative efficiency for periods without private information for early and late trading periods.  
The mean allocative efficiency is 0.766, 0.833, and 0.750 for the market closure, temporary 
halt, and no interruption conditions, respectively.  Tukey pairwise tests indicate no significant 
differences across circuit breaker conditions for early periods at the ten percent level.  For the 
late trading periods, the market closure group is significantly less efficient than the temporary halt 
group at p = 0.067.  In periods without private information, traders with zero tax rates hold 
more certificates even if, as in the temporary halt condition, price improperly adjusts.  Thus, 
even erroneous price movements can promote allocative efficiency because those with a zero 
tax rate are motivated to hold certificates. 
3.3.2. Periods With Private Information. Panel B of Table 7 reports the mean 
allocative efficiency for periods with private information.  Although mean allocative efficiencies 
are high, they indicate partial rather than full revelation of information.  With full revelation of 
information, allocative efficiencies would not differ significantly from one.  As our measures 
differ significantly from one in most cases, we conclude that partial revelation of information is 
indicated.  Tukey pairwise tests indicate no significant differences across circuit breaker 
conditions for the early periods.  For the late periods, efficiency in the market closure condition 
is significantly less than that in the temporary halt condition at p = 0.014.  Although price  
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deviations from rational expectations predictions are larger in the temporary halt condition, more 
certificates are held by the correct trader type.
17     
 
4. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
This study examines the effect of circuit breakers on market behavior when agents are 
uncertain about the presence of private information.  Circuit breakers have the potential to play 
a useful role under these conditions if unwarranted price movements are tempered.  Most 
notably, if agents mistakenly infer that others possess private information, circuit breakers may 
prevent prices from deviating from the uninformed expectation.   
Our results indicate unequivocally that circuit breakers have no beneficial effect in 
tempering unwarranted price movements.  In fact, breakers that trigger a temporary halt appear 
to have a detrimental effect.  Our data suggest that with a temporary halt, agents are more likely 
to mistakenly infer that others possess private information, which causes price to move away 
from the uninformed expectation.  We do not find a similar result with market closure.   
Notably, in periods without private information, price deviations from the uninformed 
expectation are greater in markets with temporary halts than in those with market closure.  This 
result raises an interesting question.  If temporary halts fail to prevent unwarranted price 
movements, why would the possibility of market closure cause prices to be closer to the 
uninformed expectation?  When faced with the possibility of a trading interruption, agents in our 
markets, as in securities markets like the NYSE, are faced with making decisions under time 
pressure.  In such a situation, the decision-maker faces a real dilemma because mistakes can be 
made by acting too quickly or by waiting too long, particularly as windows of opportunity may  
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no longer be available (Payne, Bettman, Luce (1996)).  In the case of a temporary halt, 
windows of opportunity re-open as the market does.  With market closure looming, traders are 
subject to greater time pressure.  They have fewer opportunities to reverse decisions or act on 
information. 
A vast literature in psychology and decision-making examines how people respond 
under time pressure.  Importantly, individuals may adapt and accelerate information processing 
and focus on important information (Ben Zur and Breznitz (1981)).  With moderate time 
pressure, decision makers’ performance improves, as they focus on relevant cues and exclude 
the peripheral (Easterbrook (1959)).  Decision makers increase speed so that they can 
incorporate more relevant information in the time available. 
Consistent with this evidence, in our experiment the threat of market closure may have 
the effect of forcing participants to rapidly assimilate relevant, available information.  As pointed 
out by Eisenhardt (1993, page 121), in environments with great stress due to time pressure, “the 
decision-making dilemma  … comes from the fact that it is easy to make mistakes by deciding 
too soon and equally ineffective to delay choices or to imitate others.”  Traders are time 
constrained so that the risks inherent in imitating others are significant.  They must focus on 
important information and avoid dwelling on extraneous cues.  By comparison, in markets with 
temporary halts, agents have extra time on their hands when the circuit breaker rule is triggered.  
The temporary halt may cause agents to focus on irrelevant information, which has an 
unfavorable effect on price behavior.  Our results suggest that further research is necessary to 
systematically investigate the effects of time pressure and introspection on investors’ behavior.  
A laboratory setting provides a conducive environment to perform such research.  
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The data fail to suggest that circuit breakers have a significant impact on trading volume 
or allocative efficiencies in our markets.  We conclude that circuit breakers play no useful role 
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In Panel A, the table shows the market regimes used across the experimental sessions.  The 
circuit breaker rule that corresponds to each regime also is described.  In Panel B, the table 
presents the number of informed traders and the dividend per period.  The likelihood that two of 
eight traders are privately informed of the dividend in a given period is 50 percent.  The 
dividend per period is determined by drawing from a distribution in which 3.50, 4.25, 5.00, 
5.75, and 6.50 are equally likely.  Across all market sessions, half the traders pay a zero tax 
rate on dividend earnings and half pay a 30 percent tax rate.  Informed traders always have a 
zero tax rate. 
 
Panel A: Market Structure 
 





The probability of market closure is 90 percent if the 
price changes 20 percent or more in either direction.  
The probability of market closure is 50 percent if the 






The probability of a trading halt is 90 percent if the 
price changes 20 percent or more in either direction.  
The probability of a trading halt is 50 percent if the 
price changes by at least 10 percent but less than 20 
percent.  Trading halts last 30 seconds; however, the 
breaker is relaxed in the last minute of trading.  That 
is, halts do not occur in the last minute. 
No Interruption  7-9  None 
 
Panel B: Pre-selected Fraction of Informed Traders and Dividend Earnings Each Period 
 
Period  Fraction of Informed Traders   Dividend 
1  2 of 8  5.00 
2  0 of 8  3.50 
3  0 of 8  4.25 
4  2 of 8  5.75 
5  0 of 8  5.00 
6  0 of 8  4.25 
7  2 of 8  3.50 
8  0 of 8  6.50 
9  2 of 8  4.25 
10  2 of 8  5.75 
11  0 of 8  6.50 
12  0 of 8  4.25 
13  2 of 8  5.00 
14  0 of 8  3.50 





Price and Allocation Predictions  
 
The table presents theoretical price and allocation predictions.  If private information is fully 
disseminated, prices fully reveal information.  Five dividend realizations are equally likely ($3.50, 
$4.25, $5.00, $5.75, $6.50) and half the traders pay a zero tax rate on dividend earnings and 
the other half pay 30 percent.  In some periods two of eight traders are privately informed of the 
dividend to be paid.  Trader types are denoted (T, x) where the tax rate (T) is zero or 30 
percent and the trader is informed or uninformed (x = i, u). 
 
No Information  Private Information 
Dividend 
Price  Allocation  Price  Allocation 
3.50  3.50 
4.25  4.25  
5.00  5.00  















Analysis of Price Deviations in Periods Without Private Information 
 
Panel A presents the means and standard deviations of the absolute deviation in asset price from the 
uninformed price in periods without private information.  The measure is computed as the absolute value of 
the difference between the closing price per period and the uninformed price, normalized by the uninformed 
price.  The data are presented separately for early and late periods.  Early periods include 2, 3, 5, and 6 and 
late periods include 8, 11, 12, and 14.  For early periods, Tukey pairwise comparisons indicate that none of 
the group means are significantly different at conventional levels (in all cases p > 0.10).  For late periods, the 
mean of the temporary halt group is significantly different from the means of the other two groups at p < 
0.01.  Panel B presents the frequency of transaction prices that deviate, in absolute terms, from the 
uninformed price by 10 percent or more and by less than 10 percent (denoted |Dev|).  |Dev| is independent of 
the market condition for early periods (c
2 = 2.42, p = 0.298), but not for late periods (c
2 = 69.84, p < 0.001).  
Panel C presents the frequency of closing prices per period that deviate, in absolute terms, from the 
uninformed price by 10 percent or more and by less than 10 percent.  |Dev| is independent of the market 
condition for early periods (c
2 = 2.48, p = 0.289), but not for late periods (c
2 = 7.25, p = 0.027).   
 
Panel A: Normalized, Absolute Price Deviations From Uninformed Price 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation)  Market Condition 

















Panel B: Frequency of Deviations in Transaction Prices per Period From Uninformed 
Price 
Early Periods  Late Periods 
Market Condition 
|Dev| $ 10%  |Dev| < 10%  |Dev| $ 10%  |Dev| < 10% 
Market Closure  5  76  8  67 
Temporary Halt  12  78  46  42 
No Interruption  11  91  5  98 
 
Panel C: Frequency of Deviations in the Closing Price per Period From Informed Price  
Early Periods  Late Periods 
Market Condition 
|Dev| $ 10%  |Dev| < 10%  |Dev| $ 10%  |Dev| < 10% 
Market Closure  3  9  5  7 
Temporary Halt  2  10  8  4 





Analysis of Price Deviations in Periods With Private Information 
 
Panel A presents the means and standard deviations of the absolute deviation in asset price from 
the informed price in periods with private information.  The measure is computed as the absolute 
value of the difference between the closing price per period and the informed price, normalized 
by the informed price.  The data are presented separately for early and late periods.  Early 
periods include 1, 4, and 7 and late periods include 9, 10, 13, and 15.  For both sets of 
periods, Tukey pairwise comparisons indicate that none of the group means are significantly 
different at conventional levels (in all cases p > 0.10).  Panel B presents the frequency of 
transaction prices that deviate, in absolute terms, from the informed price by 10 percent or more 
and by less than 10 percent (denoted |Dev|).  For both sets of periods, |Dev| is independent of 
the market condition (c
2 = 3.94, p = 0.140 for early periods and c
2 = 3.83, p = 0.148 for late 
periods).  Panel C presents the frequency of closing transaction prices per period that deviate, 
in absolute terms, from the informed price by 10 percent or more and by less than 10 percent.  
For both sets of periods, |Dev| is independent of the market condition (c
2 = 0.31, p = 0.858 for 
early periods and c
2 = 1.42, p = 0.492 for late periods). 
 
Panel A: Normalized, Absolute Price Deviations From Informed Price 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation)  Market Condition 

















Panel B: Deviation in Transaction Price per Period From Informed Price 
Early Periods  Late Periods 
Market Condition 
|Dev| $ 10%  |Dev| < 10%  |Dev| $ 10%  |Dev| < 10% 
Market Closure  31  20  32  47 
Temporary Halt  33  42  29  77 
No Interruption  37  44  40  70 
 
Panel C: Deviation in the Final Price per Period From Informed Price  
Early Periods  Late Periods 
Market Condition 
|Dev| $ 10%  |Dev| < 10%  |Dev| $ 10%  |Dev| < 10% 
Market Closure  4  5  3  9 
Temporary Halt  4  5  1  11 







Descriptive Data on Trading Volume and Time per Period  
 
The table presents the average number of transactions per period by market condition.  The 
table also reports the average number of seconds per period that markets in the closure and 
temporary halt conditions are open for trading.  With no interruption, markets are always open 
240 seconds, which is the maximum number of seconds per period for trading in all market 
conditions.  The periods with private information are denoted with a superscripted I. 
 
Market Closure  Temporary Halt  No Interruption 
Period  Transactions  Seconds  Transactions  Seconds  Transactions 
  1
I  2.67  101  6.33  220  8.00 
2   5.00  166  7.67  240  8.00 
3   7.00  208  8.00  220  7.67 
  4
 I  5.33  100  10.33  230  10.00 
5  7.67  240  8.00  240  8.67 
6  7.33  240  6.33  240  9.67 
  7
 I  9.00  240  8.33  230  9.00 
8  8.67  240  8.00  230  10.00 
  9
 I  5.33  138  9.00  230  10.00 
  10
 I  6.33  179  9.33  230  8.67 
11  3.33  107  7.67  210  7.33 
12  5.00  173  7.33  220  8.33 
  13
 I  8.00  240  8.33  240  7.00 
14  8.00  204  6.33  220  8.67 
  15
 I  6.67  117  8.67  230  11.00 





Analysis of Trading Volume Normalized by the Time the Market is Open 
 
Panel A presents the means and standard deviations of the normalized trading volume per 
period in periods without private information.  The normalized trading volume is the number of 
transactions per period divided by the number of seconds that the market period is open.  The 
data are presented separately for early and late periods.  Early periods include 2, 3, 5, and 6 
and late periods include 8, 11, 12, and 14.  For both sets of periods, Tukey pairwise 
comparisons indicate that none of the group means differ significantly at conventional levels (in 
all cases p > 0.10).  Panel B presents the means and standard deviations of trading volume per 
period in periods with private information.  The data are presented separately for early and late 
periods.  For both sets of periods, Tukey pairwise comparisons indicate that none of the group 
means differ significantly at conventional levels (in all cases p > 0.10).    
 
Panel A: Normalized Volume per Period in Periods Without Private Information 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation)  Market Condition 

















Panel B: Normalized Volume per Period in Periods With Private Information 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation)  Market Condition 























Analysis of Allocative Efficiency 
 
Panel A presents the means and standard deviations of allocative efficiency per period in 
periods without private information.  Allocative efficiency is defined as the proportion of 
certificates held by traders with a zero tax rate.  The data are presented separately for early and 
late periods.  Early periods include 2, 3, 5, and 6 and late periods include 8, 11, 12, and 14.  
For early periods, Tukey pairwise comparisons indicate that none of the group means differ 
significantly at conventional levels (in all cases p > 0.10).  For late periods, the mean of the 
market closure group is significantly different from that of the temporary halt group at p = 0.067.  
Panel B presents the means and standard deviations of allocative efficiency per period in 
periods with private information.  The data are presented separately for early and late periods.  
Early periods include 1, 4, and 7 and late periods include 9, 10, 13, and 15.  For early periods, 
Tukey pairwise comparisons indicate that none of the group means differ significantly at 
conventional levels (in all cases p > 0.10).  For late periods, the mean of the market closure 
group is significantly different from that of the temporary halt group at p = 0.014.  
 
Panel A: Periods Without Private Information 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation)  Market Condition 

















Panel B: Periods With Private Information 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation)  Market Condition 
























1 We focus on market-wide mandated trading halts triggered by extreme market movements.  
Other trading restrictions include the NYSE’s Rule 80A restricting stock index arbitrage, the 
price limits commonly imposed in futures markets, and firm-specific trading halts called in 
response to order flow imbalances or pending news releases. 
 
2 Other empirical research examines whether trading restrictions (e.g., firm-specific trading halts 
and price limits) affect price volatility and market efficiencies.   The results are inconclusive.  For 
example, while some researchers argue that trading restrictions reduce volatility (Ma, Rao, and 
Sears (1989a, 1989b)), others find that volatility increases (Lee, Ready, Seguin (1994)), and 
still others find little effect on the market in the long run (Overdahl and McMillan (1998)). 
 
3 Bakshi and Madan (1999) provide a theoretical and empirical investigation of the economics 
of stock market crashes.  Using a long time series of daily data on the DJIA, they document that 
the probability of a daily stock price decline in excess of five percent is about 25 percent.  
Booth and Broussard (1998) also investigate the stochastic behavior of large movements in the 
DJIA and estimate the probability that a circuit breaker will be triggered.  If the circuit breaker 
is kept at its current initial level of ten percent, it is likely to be triggered once every 6.38 periods 
(Table 3, p. 198). 
 
4 Four mirages are characterized as sustained and nine as temporary.  The distinction is made on 
the basis of whether the mirage persists throughout the entire period or only part of the period. 
 
5 Models of cascades proposed in the literature are applicable in numerous contexts.  For 
example, Welch (1992) provides an application to the IPO market.  When IPO shares are sold 
sequentially, imitation is optimal and cascades result because investors can learn from the 
purchasing behavior of others. 
 
6 The instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
 
7 See Cason and Friedman (1996) on the benefits of using a pre-selected sequence. 
 
8 Although the U.S. circuit breaker rule only calls for trading interruptions when there are 
downward price movements, circuit breakers can be activated if there is a dramatic upward 
price movement in some foreign markets. For example, the Russian stock market closed half an 
hour early on January 1, 2000 as the RTS1-Interfax index soared 16.83% after Boris Yeltsin 
announced his resignation (The World's Markets: Moscow). 
 
9 Participants’ responses to the post-experiment questionnaire suggest that they found the 




seven-point scale as to how interesting they found the experiment, where 1 = not very 
interesting and 7 = very interesting.  The mean response was 6.11.  Participants also responded 
on a seven-point scale as to how they would characterize the amount of money earned for 
taking part in the experiment, where 1 = nominal amount and 7 = considerable amount.  The 
mean response was 5.15. 
 
10  In one of nine periods, no further transactions occurred once the market reopened. 
 
11 The results are virtually identical if the rule is modified so that only two consecutive trades are 
required at prices that produce absolute deviations from the uninformed expectation of at least 
10 percent (and the closing price per period produces an absolute deviation of at least 15 
percent).  In the 24 periods without private information, the rule is satisfied once in the market 
closure condition, eight times in the temporary halt condition, and never in the no interruption 
condition.  The c
2-statistic of 14.48 is significant at p = 0.001. 
 
12 Notably, the mean of the temporary halt condition is generally less than those of the other two 
conditions, though not significantly different.  Further examination of the data suggests that when 
the informed price is less than the uninformed price, asset prices do not always adjust to reflect 
the informed price in the market closure and no interruption conditions.  By comparison, when 
the informed price is greater than the uninformed price, asset prices typically adjust to reflect the 
informed price.  These results produce the relatively high standard deviations in the early periods 
for the market closure and no interruption conditions (refer to Panel A of Table 4). 
 
13 Recall that temporary halts cannot be triggered in the last minute of trading.  Thus, draws do 
not necessarily occur if the transaction price lies outside the breaker boundaries.  We identify 
three periods in which transactions occur in the last minute at prices outside the breaker 
boundaries. 
 
14 In addition, we perform a repeated measures ANOVA.  The independent variables include 
market condition, period, and an interaction term.  The dependent variable is the normalized 
trading volume per period for each session.  We find that market condition is not significant at 
conventional levels (F = 0.49, p = 0.634). 
 
15 Again we perform a repeated measures ANOVA.  We find that normalized trading volume is 
not affected by market condition (F = 1.97, p = 0.220). 
 
16 Though not reported, the results are similar using nonparametric, Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
tests. 
 
17 We also examine the relative profitability of informed and uninformed traders. Ackert, 
Church, and Jayaraman report that the distribution of trading profit among agents is not affected 
by a circuit breaker rule and, over, time, the wealth of informed and uninformed agents does not 




informed agents are able to exploit uninformed agents and generate greater wealth, unlike the 
markets of Ackert, Church, and Jayaraman.  This finding is not surprising because, in our 
markets, private information perfectly reveals asset value. 